Ziqi Lu

Assistant Professor of Economics · Jinan University

Portrait of Ziqi Lu

I am an Assistant Professor in the School of Economics at Jinan University in Guangzhou, China.

My research lies at the intersection of cultural economics, political economy, and behavioral economics. I study how social relationships and institutions shape cooperation, beliefs, and economic exchange, using applied theory, experiments, and observational data.

I received my PhD in Economics from Harvard University and my BA in Physics and Economics from Williams College.

Email · Curriculum vitae

Publications

Correlation Neglect on Social Media: Effects on Civil Service Applications in China

With Yihong Huang and Yixi Jiang. The Economic Journal, 2025, 135(672), 2509–2530.

Repeated exposure to redundant social-media information changes beliefs and career decisions: a Weibo experiment reduced civil-service exam registration by 11%.

Published article · Paper

Abstract

How does repeated exposure to correlated information affect beliefs and decisions? In a field experiment on Weibo, we exposed Chinese college students to redundant negative posts about civil service jobs. Relative to the control group, treated students held views that were 0.16 standard deviations more negative and were 11% less likely to register for civil service exams. A supplementary online experiment produces similar findings and shows that attention moderates the effect. The results demonstrate that correlation neglect can influence consequential choices outside the laboratory.

Working Papers

Relational Volatility and the Transformation of Cooperation

With Yifei Wu. Manuscript being revised.

Volatility in the incentives to leave relationships can broaden cooperation beyond close communities, leading to the expansion of weak ties and the extensive use of contracts.

Slides

Abstract

Why can cooperation extend beyond close communities even as social ties weaken? We develop a repeated prisoner’s dilemma with voluntary separation in which the payoff from leaving a relationship fluctuates over time. Greater relational volatility destabilizes close partnerships but can prolong interactions between strangers, making sustainable cooperation less dependent on social distance. This generates a behavioral form of universalism without changing preferences. Yet this universalism is “thin”: cooperation can expand across social boundaries while becoming harder to sustain when it entails high individual costs. With endogenous relationship formation, individuals seek more socially distant partners, increasing the prevalence of weak ties. When third-party enforcement is available, volatility expands the use of formal contracts, including within close relationships previously sustained without them. The model connects the weakening of close communities, the expansion of cooperation among strangers, and the spread of contracting through a common change in the conditions sustaining repeated interaction.

The Price of Procurement Access

With Geng Huang, Shiyuan Liu, and Gufeng Mai.

Bribery purchases durable, purpose-specific procurement access; payments vary more with localities recipients’ administrative settings than with firms’ gains from access.

Paper

Abstract

We link 5,171 firms identified in bribery cases to 10.8 million Chinese public procurement contracts to study the value and pricing of procurement access. Procurement gains persist for about three years, including among firms with only one recorded bribery year, and are concentrated among firms that paid for procurement-related purposes. Larger firms and firms in more competitive industries obtain greater gains, but these differences are only weakly reflected in recorded payments. Instead, bribe amounts vary substantially with recipients’ locality and their departments’ administrative level. These findings suggest that bribery purchases durable, purpose-specific access at prices that are only coarsely differentiated across firms. In a financial subsample of about 1,000 firms, we find no detectable improvement in returns on assets or equity following bribery.

Does Mobility Make a Nice Person? Theory and Evidence from Across the Globe

The option to leave a relationship can support cooperation while weakening reciprocity; involuntary separation undermines cooperation.

Paper

Abstract

How does mobility affect cooperation when people can leave their relationships? I develop a repeated prisoner’s dilemma with voluntary separation. Greater voluntary mobility supports more unconditional cooperation, particularly among patient players, but also allows defectors to escape future punishment, making its effect on conditional cooperation ambiguous. Involuntary mobility always weakens cooperation. A meta-analysis of twelve prisoner’s dilemma experiments finds that voluntary mobility increases cooperation while weakening reciprocity. Evidence from the World Values Survey and Gallup World Poll is also consistent with the model’s predictions. The results distinguish the effects of opportunities to leave from those of involuntary disruption.

Beyond Individualism: How Clan-Based Collectivism Drives Economic Prosperity and Equality in Modern China

With Zhongqi Deng and Tingfan Gao.

A growth model and evidence from China examine how clan ties can support innovation and development while narrowing income inequality.

Paper

Abstract

We study how clan culture shapes innovation, economic development, and income inequality. A growth model incorporating clan culture predicts higher asset prices, greater investment in research and development, and a smaller gap between capital and labor incomes. Using genealogical records to measure changes in local clan culture in China from 2004 to 2020, we find that stronger clan culture predicts higher local income and lower inequality. The empirical analysis combines a shift-share instrumental-variable approach with spatial models and finds substantial spillovers across locations. The paper connects clan-based social organization to innovation and the distribution of income.

Work in Progress

Authoritarianism as a Form of Cooperation: Theory and Evidence from Across the Globe

I study how confidence in political institutions relates to support for authoritarian leadership, interpreting political delegation through a model of trust in elites.

Project description

Using the World Values Survey, I find that greater confidence in political institutions is associated with stronger support for military or religious leadership at both the individual and aggregate levels, controlling for demographics and institutional quality. A model of delegation provides a possible interpretation: people who trust political institutions and elites are more willing to transfer decision-making authority to them.

Endogenizing Social Image Concern: A Theory of Self-Presentation in Everyday Life

I model concern for social image as an outcome of the need to find and maintain cooperative partners.

Project description

In a model of gift exchange, individuals help one another and form partnerships according to perceived types, which are inferred from past behavior. Social image matters because it affects access to cooperative relationships. The model shows how concern for social image can emerge endogenously and how greater diversity in types can strengthen it.